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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PRISON INMATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS—SO NOW WHAT?

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, reports concerning the receipt of organ transplants by
prison inmates have surfaced. In February of 2003, for example, the media
reported that the state of Nebraska was planning to provide a female inmate
with a life-saving liver transplant at the expense of Nebraska taxpayers.1
Carolyn Joy, the inmate seeking the transplant, was convicted of first degree
murder and is currently serving a life sentence at the Nebraska Correctional
Center for Women in York.2 Doctors who evaluated Joy’s liver disease
concluded that her only chance of long-term survival was a liver transplant.3
Although Joy was initially cleared for receipt of a liver, her placement on a
liver transplant waiting list was contingent upon her losing weight and better
controlling her diabetes.4
Similarly, in the spring of 2003, the media learned that Oregon was
considering providing convicted murderer and death-row inmate Horacio
Alberto Reyes-Camarena with a kidney transplant.5 Although a prison doctor
had concluded that Reyes-Camarena was a good transplant candidate,6 the
prisoner ultimately failed to receive a transplant because a medical review
board determined that Reyes-Camarena failed to meet several criteria for
transplant eligibility.7 Despite the fact that Reyes-Camarena was denied a

1. Karyn Spencer et al., Inmate Approved for Transplant List, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Feb. 4, 2003, at 2B.
2. Id. Joy, a former prostitute, was convicted of “robbing, sexually assaulting and
murdering another prostitute.” Id.
3. Id. Joy attributed her liver condition to the alcohol and heroine she abused during her
years as a prostitute. Id.
4. Id.
5. Michael Higgins, Death-row Inmate up for Transplant: Murderer may get Kidney,
NAT’L POST, May 28, 2003, at A3. In 1996, Reyes-Camarena brutally attacked two women. One
of the women died from multiple stab wounds. Reyes-Camarena was convicted of murder and
sentenced to die by lethal injection. Id.
6. Lee Douglas, Killer in Need of New Kidney Starts Ethics Row, CHI. TRIB., May 29,
2003, at 10.
7. Camille Spencer, Panel Denies Transplant for Inmate on Death Row but Issue Remains,
OREGONIAN (Portland), June 12, 2003, at B1 (article fails to specify what criteria led to ReyesCamarena’s failure to receive a transplant).
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kidney transplant for medical reasons, many Oregonians were concerned that
prison officials would even consider providing a death-row inmate with a
transplant at the taxpayers’ expense.8
Reports concerning prisoners’ actual receipt of organ transplants have also
surfaced. The most extensively covered story involved a California inmate
who, in January of 2002, received a heart transplant at Stanford Medical
Center at a cost to taxpayers of one million dollars.9 The unidentified inmate
was serving a fourteen-year sentence for an armed robbery conviction.10 Less
than a year after receiving the life-saving transplant, the unknown inmate died.
Officials attributed the inmate’s death to his being a “less than model
patient.”11 The prisoner had failed to strictly adhere to the rigorous postoperative care regimen.12
Reports such as those concerning Joy, Reyes-Camarena, and the
unidentified California inmate incited rage among many law-abiding citizens
and debate among medical, ethical, and legal experts.13 In the wake of the
California prisoner’s heart transplant, authorities feared citizens might destroy
their organ donor cards in outrage.14 This public outcry, in turn, has caused
leaders in government to attempt to fashion solutions to the problem of
prisoners receiving transplants. In the summer of 2003, for example, a bill was
introduced in the Louisiana state legislature that would have prohibited statefunded organ transplants “for people who have exhausted all appeals after a
conviction for first-degree murder, punishable by death or a life sentence, and
second-degree murder, which carries a mandatory life sentence.”15 Likewise,
in early 2003, legislation was introduced in California that would permit those
who sign organ donor cards to exclude prisoners from receiving their donated
organs.16

8. Id.
9. Prisoner Gets $1M Heart Transplant (Jan. 31, 2002), at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2002/01/31/health/main32605.shtml?CMP=ILC-Search/.
10. Id.
11. Bill Allowing Donor Card Signers to Exclude Prisoners from Getting Their Organs
Introduced in California, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Jan. 15, 2003, at O [hereinafter Bill Allowing
Donor Card Signers].
12. Id. (article does not specifically identify the causes of the inmate’s death).
13. Bryan Robinson, Death-Row Privilege: Condemned Prisoner May Get Kidney
Transplant While Law-Abiding Citizens Wait, May 28, 2002, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/
us/GoodMorningAmerica/deathrow_transplant030528.html [hereinafter Death-Row Privilege].
See also Douglas, supra note 6, at 10; Jeremy Olson, Urgency Comes First in Transplant
Criteria, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 9, 2003, at 1B.
14. Bill Allowing Donor Card Signers, supra note 11, at O.
15. Panel Backs Ban on Inmate Transplants, THE BATON ROUGE ADVOC., June 13, 2003, at
15A.
16. Bill Allowing Donor Card Signers, supra note 11, at O.
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Any attempt to quell the public outcry against organ transplants for
prisoners necessarily involves three issues. First, one must understand why
prisoner organ transplants have so greatly enraged the American public.
Therefore, Part II of this Note briefly addresses organ transplants, America’s
aging prison population, and the troublesome intersection of these two issues.
Once the basis for the public outcry is understood, one must then ask whether
states are constitutionally required to provide prison inmates with organ
transplants.17 Part III of this Note discusses the legal standard by which prison
health care is assessed. Part IV analyzes the prisoner transplant issue in the
context of Part III and ultimately determines that states are required under the
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution to provide prisoners with medically
necessary organ transplants. In light of Part IV’s conclusion that states cannot
appease the public by simply refusing to provide prisoners with organ
transplants, Part V examines three classes of possible solutions to the public’s
outrage. After examination of potential solutions, this Note concludes that
proposals aimed at reducing the country’s aging prison population are the most
promising and in fact the only viable solution to this serious problem.
II. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In order to truly understand the debate concerning prisoner receipt of organ
transplants, it is essential to first understand the nature of organ transplants and
the current state of America’s prison population. Section A gives a brief
history of organ transplantation and an overview of the current state of organ
transplantation in America. Section B explains the current state of America’s
prison population. Section C examines the intersection between the current
state of organ transplantation and the demographics of the country’s prison
population.
A.

Organ Transplants

The history of organ transplants in the United States is relatively short.
The first successful kidney transplant was performed in 1954, the first
successful liver transplant in 1967, and the first successful heart-lung
transplant in 1981.18 Though transplantation was considered experimental by
some at its advent, the practice has become widely accepted and frequently
practiced in recent years.19

17. Indeed, if states are not constitutionally required to provide prisoners with organ
transplants, the public outcry could be quelled simply by refusing to provide inmates with organ
transplants.
18. Timeline of Key Events in U.S. Transplantation and UNOS History, at
http://www.UNOS.org/whoweare/history.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
19. See generally Eric F. Galen, Comment, Organ Transplantation at the Millennium:
Regulatory Framework, Allocation Prerogatives, and Political Interests, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
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From January to June of 2004, for example, the United Network for Organ
Sharing (“UNOS”)20 reported that 13,222 organ transplants were performed in
America alone.21 Success rates for organ transplants similarly indicate that
such procedures are no longer experimental. For example, of those who
received heart transplants from 1996 to 1999, three-year survival rates varied
from 72.0% to 83.5% depending on the age of the person undergoing the
procedure.22 Similarly, three-year survival rates for kidney recipients ranged
from 78.0% to 100.0% depending on the age of the patient.23 Consequently,
organ transplantation is no longer considered an experimental procedure in the
United States but rather is a frequently performed surgery with generally
successful results.24
Despite the frequency and success of organ transplants, the procedures are
not without their downfalls. In particular, finding a suitable organ is difficult.25
Moreover, once a suitable organ is found, the cost of the transplant can be
exorbitant.26
As of September 8, 2004, UNOS reported that 86,743 people were
candidates on organ transplant waiting lists.27 The number of people on
transplant waiting lists, however, greatly exceeds the number of organ donors
in the United States. As a consequence, thousands of individuals die annually
while waiting for a suitable organ to come along. In 2003, for example, 6,257
people who had been placed on transplant waiting lists died before a suitable

L.J. 335 (1999); Kelly Ann Keller, Comment, The Bed of Life: A Discussion of Organ Donation,
its Legal and Scientific History, and a Recommended “Opt-Out” Solution to Organ Scarcity, 32
STETSON L. REV. 855 (2003).
20. UNOS is non-profit organization that manages transplant waiting lists and organ
allocation in the United States. Jessica Wright, Note, Medically Necessary Organ Transplants for
Prisoners: Who is Responsible for Payment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1255–56 (1998).
21. U.S. Transplantation Data, at http://www.UNOS.org/data/default.asp?displayType
=usdata (last visited Sept. 8, 2004). Data is updated daily. Readers interested in learning the
most recent figures should visit the website.
22. Heart Kaplan-Meier Graft Survival Rates for Transplants Performed: 1996-2001, at
www.optn.org/latestData/rptStrat.asp (Sept. 3, 2004). The UNOS website contains detailed
survival information for all organ transplants organized by specific medical criteria. See the
UNOS website at http://www.unos.org for a fuller discussion.
23. Kidney Kaplan-Meier Patient Survival Rates for Transplants Performed: 1996-2001, at
http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptStrat.asp (Sept. 3, 2004).
24. Dulcinea A. Grantham, Comment, Transforming Transplantation: The Effect of the
Health and Human Services Final Rule on the Organ Allocation System, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 751,
751 (2001) (“Organ transplantation, once a risky and uncommon procedure, is now a routine
medical procedure with a relatively high success rate.”).
25. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
27. U.S. Transplantation Data, supra note 21.
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organ was located.28 Due to drastic organ shortages, the decision to provide
one candidate with an organ transplant necessarily sentences another waitlisted
candidate to death.
Even if one is able to find a suitable organ, the cost of the procedure is
staggering. The average organ transplant costs $214,860.29 Consequently, the
vast majority of Americans would be unable to cover the cost of a transplant
out-of-pocket. While some health insurance companies have begun to expand
coverage to medically necessary transplants, coverage is far from consistent.30
Similarly, Medicaid does not consistently cover the costs of these procedures.31
As a result, many citizens who need an organ transplant to survive will die
because of their inability to finance the life-saving surgery.
B.

America’s Aging Prison Population

America’s prison population is aging. Inmates fifty-five and older
constitute approximately forty-five percent of all prisoners.32 In addition, this
same prison population is rapidly growing and is expected to continue on this
upward trend.33 As prisoners grow older, their health deteriorates. Studies
have found that elderly inmates suffer from “a variety of physical problems
associated with aging.”34 In light of their failing health, elderly inmates are
likely to require medically necessary organ transplants.35
As the health of elderly inmates declines, the cost of caring for and
incarcerating such inmates skyrockets. Estimates indicate that the cost of
28. Fast Facts about Transplants Jan. 1, 2003-Dec. 31, 2003, at www.ustransplant.org/
csr_0704/facts.php (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
29. Paul Lesko & Kevin Buckley, Attack of the Clones . . . And the Issues of Clones, 3
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 19 (2002). The average heart transplant costs $303,400, the
average kidney transplant $111,300, the average liver transplant $244,600, the average pancreas
transplant $113,700, and the average heart-lung transplant $301,200. Id. at 19 n.10.
30. Wright, supra note 20, at 1254.
31. Id.
32. Sam Torres, Article Review, FEDERAL PROBATION, June 2003, at 62 (reviewing
Catherine M. Lemieux, et al., Revisiting the Literature on Prisoners Who are Older: Are We
Wiser?, in THE PRISON J., Dec. 2002, at 440). For the purposes of this Note, the prison
demographic termed “elderly inmates” generally refers to prisoners age fifty-five and up.
33. Tammerlin Drummond, Cellblock Seniors, TIME, June 21, 1999, at 60. In fact, “[m]en
55 and older comprise one of the fastest-growing cohorts in the prison population.” George F.
Will, A Jail Break for Geriatrics, NEWSWEEK, July 20, 1998, at 70.
34. Torres, supra note 32. Common conditions include hypertension, emphysema, and heart
and respiratory diseases. Id.
35. Some have hypothesized that the recentness of the prisoner organ transplant debate is
attributable to the fact that “prisons are only recently seeing inmates who are aging.” Wright,
supra note 20, at 1252. Similarly, CBS News reported that “taxpayer-financed transplants are
likely to increase as the prison population ages.” Prisoner Gets $1M Heart Transplant, supra
note 9. Therefore, one can expect the concern about prisoner organ transplant to rise in
accordance with the consistent increase of elderly inmates.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

544

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:539

caring for an elderly inmate is generally two to three times that of caring for an
average young inmate.36 Some approximate that incarcerating an elderly
inmate costs $65,000 per year.37 Given that the number of elderly inmates is
projected to substantially increase, it is inevitable that taxpayers will spend
more each year to incarcerate these prisoners.
C. Framing the Public Debate: The Intersection of Organ Transplants and
America’s Aging Prison Population
Many law-abiding citizens resent paying for the medical care of those
behind bars. The issue of providing inmates with organ transplants at the
taxpayer’s expense, however, has led to arguably the loudest public outcry
against state-financed medical care for prisoners. This tremendous public
backlash can be attributed to the intersection of organ transplant issues and
America’s aging prison population.
In addition to simply having to pay for prisoner organ transplants, many
taxpayers also dislike the idea that tax dollars go to provide inmates with a
medical procedure that many law-abiding citizens are unable to afford. For
example, Dudley Sharp, a spokesperson for a Houston-based victims’ rights
group, has argued that “[i]t is unconscionable that we would put [prisoners] . . .
ahead of hard working citizens that are not even on the list [for transplants]
because they can’t afford the insurance.”38 Others have expressed similar
sentiments.39
In addition to the cost-prohibitive nature of the procedures, the idea of
providing prison inmates with organ transplants has also been attacked because
of the scarcity of organs available for transplant. Because thousands die yearly
while awaiting an organ transplant, the allocation of an organ to a prison
inmate necessarily sentences another candidate, likely a law-abiding citizen, to
death.40
When the previous sentiments are viewed in light of America’s aging
prison population, it becomes clear that the issue of organ transplants for
inmates is not going to fade away. Rather, inmate receipt of transplants is

36. Will, supra note 33, at 70; Drummond, supra note 33, at 60.
37. Drummond, supra note 33, at 60.
38. Death-Row Privilege, supra note 13.
39. See generally Jo Dondis, Organ Debate: Should Inmates Qualify for Publicly Financed
Organ
Transplants?,
at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/ant/DailyNews/inmates_organs
020323.html (Mar. 3, 2002); Change of Heart, at http://oaktree.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/12/
60minutes/main572974.shtml (Sept. 14, 2003).
40. As noted on 60 Minutes, “by giving [a] prisoner [a transplant], a death sentence [is]
passed to someone else.” Change of Heart, supra note 39. Similarly, Dudley Sharp,
spokesperson for a Houston-based victims’ right group, has asserted that “[t]here’s no doubt—
there’s no debate—that people have lost their lives while murderers have received transplants.”
Death-Row Privilege, supra note 13.
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likely to increase as the prison population grows older and less healthy.
Consequently, more inmates may receive transplants at the taxpayers’ expense
while individuals on the outside continue to die either because of lack of
funding or lack of an available organ.
Though public backlash in light of recent transplant events has been
serious, the first issue facing states is not how to please the masses, but rather
whether they are constitutionally required to provide such controversial
procedures to inmates at all. Section III outlines the standard by which a
prisoner’s constitutional right to health care is determined.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”41 The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment controls the provision of health care to the incarcerated.42
Originally, the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment was viewed
as simply prohibiting “torture and barbaric punishments.”43 However, the
meaning of the amendment has expanded over the years and now encompasses
a variety of issues ranging from disproportionate prison sentences to prison
health care.44
Inmates who feel that their Eighth Amendment rights have been violated
may state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, civil action for deprivation
of rights.45 In Robinson v. California,46 the Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was
applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, prisoners
may bring suit for Eighth Amendment violations against both state and federal
prison authorities.

41. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
42. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
43. Ray S. Pierce, Note, Constitutional and Criminal Law —Eighth Amendment—Now You
Can’t Do That: Disproportionate Prison Sentences as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 24 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 775, 781 (2002).
44. See generally id. See also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102–103.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C § 1983 (2000).
46. 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
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In 1976, the Supreme Court decided Estelle v. Gamble,47 the seminal case
in inmate challenges to the adequacy of medical treatment under the Eighth
Amendment. Section A discusses Estelle and the standard articulated therein.
Section B uses later cases to better explain and define the Estelle standard.
A.

Estelle v. Gamble: Deliberate Indifference to a Prisoner’s Serious
Medical Needs

In Estelle, a state prisoner was injured when, in the process of unloading a
truck, he was struck with a bale of cotton.48 Seeking treatment for injuries
sustained in the accident, inmate Gamble visited prison medical personnel
seventeen times over the course of three months.49 Despite these numerous
visits and the resulting treatments, Gamble instituted a civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging “lack of diagnosis and inadequate
treatment of his back injury.”50 The Court rejected Gamble’s claim,
concluding that the actions of the defendant-physician failed to rise to the level
of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.51
Despite the ultimate failure of the prisoner’s claim, the Estelle Court
nonetheless emphasized the “government’s obligation to provide medical care
for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.”52 In support of this
proposition, the Court in Estelle relied on previous cases that had defined and
broadened the scope of Eighth Amendment protection beyond its original
prohibition on inhumane and torturous punishment.53 Prior to deciding Estelle,
the Court had “held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments which
are incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.’”54 Similarly, just months before, the Court
had determined that punishments that “involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain” violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.55 In Estelle, the Court reasoned that the government’s
failure to provide adequate medical care to prisoners could result in “torture or
a lingering death”56 or “pain and suffering . . . [that] would serve [no]

47. 429 U.S. 97.
48. Id. at 99.
49. Id. at 107.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
53. Id. at 102.
54. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
55. Id. at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
56. Id. (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)).
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penological purpose.”57 Accordingly, the government’s failure to provide
inmates with adequate health care violates the Eighth Amendment.58
Concluding that the government owed a duty of medical care to its
incarcerated, the Estelle Court then determined that government officials fail to
meet this duty when they act with “deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners.”59 The Court noted that two groups of prison officials may
manifest deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs.
First, prison doctors may manifest deliberate indifference “in their
response to the prisoner’s needs.”60 Failure of prison medical officials to
provide a prisoner adequate medical treatment, however, is not a per se
violation of the Eighth Amendment.61 “[I]nadvertant failure to provide
adequate medical care[,] . . . negligen[ce] in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition[,] . . . [and] [m]edical malpractice” on the part of prison doctors fail
to rise to the level of deliberate indifference.62 Rather, the “acts or omissions
[of prison doctors must be] sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference.”63
The Estelle Court also found that prison guards and other prison officials
can evidence deliberate indifference in two distinct ways. Prior to a prisoner
receiving medical care, prison guards may manifest deliberate indifference by
“intentionally denying or delaying access” to the medical care sought.64
Subsequent to a prisoner’s receipt of medical treatment, prison guards may
manifest deliberate indifference by “intentionally interfering with the
treatment . . . prescribed.”65
In the twenty-eight years since Estelle, lower federal courts have received
countless invitations to explain and apply the deliberate indifference standard
articulated by the Court in 1976. The following section examines subsequent
cases and organizes post-Estelle case law into themes to illustrate how the
deliberate indifference standard is applied today.
B.

Recurring Themes in Post-Estelle Cases

As described above, Estelle articulated a two-prong test for determining
whether prison authorities have provided a prisoner with adequate medical
care. The prisoner’s medical need must be serious, and the prison authorities
must manifest deliberate indifference to that serious medical need. Part 1 of
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
Id. at 102–04.
Id. at 104.
Id.
Id. at 105.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 104–05.
Id. at 105.
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this section examines recurring themes in defining “serious medical needs,”
while Part 2 examines recurring themes in defining “deliberate indifference.”
1.

Serious Medical Needs

Examination of post-Estelle cases addressing the serious medical need
prong of the deliberate indifference test reveals that courts apply three different
tests to determine whether a prisoner’s medical need is serious. The medical
need of the prisoner need not meet all three tests to be considered “serious.”
Rather, the following are simply three different manners in which courts have
articulated the “serious medical need” prong of the Estelle analysis.
In the first test, courts rely on the diagnosis and prescribed treatment of a
doctor or other health-care provider. In applying this test, courts have
uniformly held that “[a] medical need is ‘serious’ . . . if it is ‘one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment.’”66 Under this test, therefore,
a prisoner’s medical need is serious for purposes of the Estelle standard when a
medical professional has diagnosed the condition and prescribed treatment.
In the second test, courts look to the obviousness of the medical condition.
Under this standard, courts are not concerned with the diagnosis of a medical
professional, but rather the reaction such a condition would cause in a lay
person. In Ramos v. Lamm, for example, the Tenth Circuit held that “[a]
medical need is serious if it is . . . ‘one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’”67 The court in
Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro articulated an
identical standard.68
In the third test, “[t]he seriousness of an inmate’s medical need may . . . be
determined by reference to the effect of denying the particular treatment.”69 In
applying this test, courts attempt to determine the effect of leaving the
prisoner’s medical condition untreated. Where refusal of treatment would
cause “‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . [or would cause] an
inmate to suffer a lifelong handicap or permanent loss, the medical need is

66. Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir.
1987) (quoting Pace v. Fauver, 479 F.Supp. 456, 458 (D.N.J. 1979)) (involving female inmates
seeking therapeutic abortions). The Tenth Circuit articulated an almost identical standard in
Ramos v. Lamm, where it held that “[a] medical need is serious if it is ‘one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment.’” 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F.Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977)) (alleging various constitutional
violations on the part of Colorado prison officials).
67. Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575 (quoting Helgemoe, 437 F.Supp. 269 at 311).
68. “A medical need is ‘serious,’ . . . if it is . . . ‘one that is so obvious that a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347 (quoting
Pace, 479 F.Supp. at 458).
69. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347.
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considered serious.”70 In Brock v. Wright, for example, the Second Circuit
observed that “a tooth cavity is a serious medical condition, not because
cavities are always painful or otherwise dangerous, but because a cavity that is
not treated will probably become so.”71
2.

Deliberate Indifference

Examination of post-Estelle cases reveals four recurring themes in
addressing the deliberate indifference prong of the Estelle standard. Each of
the four is examined in the sections below. While, for purposes of this Note,
the four themes have been neatly divided, the same is not true in many of the
cases. The four themes frequently overlap, and where one is addressed by a
court, another is often implicated. The following sections attempt to highlight
these connections.
a.

A “Difference of Opinion” Does Not Constitute Deliberate
Indifference

The Court in Estelle did not speak in the traditional “difference of opinion”
language that is now common in many Eighth Amendment cases.
Nonetheless, the Court did address this fundamental theme. In Estelle, the
prisoner alleged that the prison doctor had acted with deliberate indifference to
his serious back injury by failing to X-ray his lower back.72 The Court rejected
this claim, however, noting that whether “additional diagnostic techniques or
forms of treatment [are] indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical
judgment.”73 Exercise of this medical judgment, the Court concluded, failed to
violate the Eighth Amendment.74
Although some courts still speak of medical judgment, many cases instead
refer to this concept as a “difference of opinion.”75 Where a decision
concerning treatment or medication manifests nothing more than a difference
of medical opinion, the courts have consistently held that this difference of
opinion does not constitute deliberate indifference.76 Closer examination of

70. Id.
71. 315 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). In Ramos, the Tenth Circuit
reached a similar conclusion in observing that dental conditions constitute serious medical needs
because “when not treated in a timely fashion [inflicted inmates] are prone to develop infections
and abscesses leading to continued pain and loss of teeth.” 639 F.2d at 576.
72. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
73. Id.
74. Id. At most, the Court found that a poor exercise of medical judgment would constitute
medical malpractice, which would fail to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id.
75. See Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 261 (7th Cir. 1996); Sanchez v.
Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Randall v. Wyrick, 642 F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir. 1981).
76. See supra notes 72–75.
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post-Estelle cases reveal two occasions in which a difference of opinion may
arise.
First, a difference of opinion may arise between medical professionals. In
Fields v. Rahimparast, for example, two physicians disagreed about the proper
course of post-operative care for an inmate recovering from the surgical
removal of hemorrhoids.77 The inmate sued when the prison doctor provided
treatment different from that prescribed by the prisoner’s physician. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the inmate’s complaint, holding that
“mere differences of opinion among medical personnel regarding a patient’s
appropriate treatment does not give rise to a deliberate indifference claim.”78
The Ninth Circuit faced a similar challenge in Sanchez v. Vild.79 There,
prison doctors disagreed about whether surgery was an appropriate method for
curing the prisoner’s rectal boils.80 When the inmate sued because the surgery
was not performed, the Sanchez court affirmed the dismissal of the prisoner’s
claim, holding that “[a] difference of opinion does not amount to a deliberate
indifference to Sanchez’ serious medical needs.”81
A difference of opinion may also arise between the inmate and the prison
health-care provider. Courts have uniformly rejected suits brought by inmates
who disagree with a prison doctor’s prescribed course of treatment, holding
that “[t]he right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment does not include
the right to the treatment of one’s choice.”82 In Johnson v. Stephan, for
example, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a prisoner’s claim that
prison doctors had manifested deliberate indifference by prescribing a leg
stocking to stimulate circulation and to decrease cramps and swelling in the
prisoner’s leg rather than prescribing the prisoner’s preferred course of
treatment.83 The court quickly disposed of the claim, finding that the inmate’s
complaint “amount[ed] to a difference of opinion with the medical staff, which
does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”84
A similar result was reached in Levy v. Kafka.85 There, a prisoner brought
suit because prison doctors failed to perform surgery to correct his hernia.86
77. No. 01-3828, 2002 WL 1453594, at *1 (7th Cir. June 26, 2002). The inmate’s physician
had recommended sitz baths to alleviate the pain and to guard against infection. The prison’s
doctor modified the recommended treatment, however, substituting hot compresses for the
suggested sitz baths. Id.
78. Id. at *2.
79. 891 F.2d at 242.
80. Id. at 241. The inmate never underwent surgery but instead was provided with hot packs
and was prescribed various anti-inflammatory and antibiotic medications. Id.
81. Id. at 242.
82. Layne v. Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 473 (1st Cir. 1981).
83. 6 F.3d 691, 692 (10th Cir. 1993). The prisoner had brought suit alleging that the use of
the leg stocking was “an improper prescription for his condition.” Id.
84. Id.
85. No. 00-3306, 2001 WL 363312 (10th Cir. Apr. 12, 2001).
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Noting that the inmate disputed the medical personnel’s diagnosis and
prescribed treatment, the court concluded that “[h]is allegations [did] not
demonstrate deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”87
b.

A Refusal to Provide Experimental Treatment Does Not Constitute
Deliberate Indifference

Cases involving experimental treatment most frequently involve a
prisoner’s request for cutting-edge medication.88 When faced with such a
demand, courts have held that refusal to provide prisoners with experimental
treatment does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.89 In Hawley v.
Evans, for example, prisoners who had tested positive for the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”) sought prescriptions for Zidovudine
(“AZT”).90 Though the court in Hawley conceded that “AZT [had] been
approved by the FDA and [was] the only antiviral agent that [had] been clearly
shown to improve immune function in AIDS patients[,]”91 it ultimately refused
to find the defendants deliberately indifferent for refusing to provide their HIV
prisoners the life-prolonging drug. Because the “[e]xperts disagree[d] about
who should receive [AZT], at what stage patients should be treated with it, and
proper dosage,”92 the court found that AZT was an experimental drug.93
Holding that prisoners “are not entitled, as a matter of constitutional right” to
receive experimental drugs, the court concluded that the state’s refusal to
provide certain HIV-positive prisoners with AZT failed to constitute deliberate
indifference.94
Other courts have reached similar conclusions. In Dias v. Vose, for
example, the court found that failure to provide an inmate with experimental
medication did not constitute deliberate indifference.95 Describing the drug

86. Id. at *1. The prisoner “believe[d] that corrective surgery and pain medication [was]
required whereas the medical staff . . . provided a truss belt . . . and concluded that surgical
intervention was not [then] indicated.” Id.
87. Id. See also Bradshaw v. Corr. Medical Services, Inc., No. 00-1664, 2001 WL 391497,
at *1 (1st Cir. Apr. 12, 2001); Mosley v. Snider, No. 00-6310, 2001 WL 281213, at *1 (10th Cir.
Mar. 22, 2001).
88. See generally Johnson v. Raba, No. 93-C-2285, 1997 WL 610403 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24,
1997); Dias v. Vose, 865 F.Supp. 53 (D. Mass. 1994); Hawley v. Evans, 716 F.Supp. 601 (N.D.
Ga. 1989).
89. See supra note 87.
90. 716 F.Supp at 602.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 603.
94. Id. at 603–04.
95. 865 F.Supp 53, 58 (D. Mass. 1994). The prisoner had brought suit after a prison doctor
failed to authorize immediate treatment of the prisoner’s Hepatitis with Interferon, a prescription
drug. Id.
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sought as “highly experimental,” the court held that refusal to immediately
provide the inmate with the medication did not constitute deliberate
indifference.96
c.

The Cost of Treatment Does Not Affect the Deliberate Indifference
Analysis

Some legal scholars have argued that cost should never be a factor in
determining the right of the incarcerated to receive medical treatment.97 In
support of this position, such scholars argue that the Supreme Court in Estelle
failed to include cost as a factor in articulating the deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs standard.98 Because the Court in Estelle wholly failed to
mention the issue of cost, these scholars conclude that cost is irrelevant in
determining whether states must provide prisoners with certain medical
treatments and procedures.99 Lower courts that have applied the Estelle
standard have reached similar conclusions.100
Some courts have realized that it is not unconstitutional for prison officials
to consider the cost of various methods in deciding how to treat a prisoner’s
medical ailment.101 Although recognizing that “[t]he state’s interest in limiting
the cost of detention . . . ordinarily will justify the state’s decision to provide
detainees with a reasonable level of. . . . medical care[,]” these same courts
have also concluded that the state’s interest in saving money “will justify
neither the complete denial [of medical care] nor the provision of [medical
care] below some minimally adequate level.”102 One can reasonably assume
that the “minimally adequate level” referred to by the court in Hamm v.
DeKalb County is equivalent to the deliberate indifference standard articulated
by the Supreme Court in Estelle. Consequently, Hamm stands for the
proposition that states need not provide prisoners with the most expensive

96. Id. For another case involving Interferon that reached the same conclusion, see Johnson
v. Raba, where the court held that refusal to prescribe the “semiexperimental” drug failed to rise
to the level of deliberate indifference. No. 93-C-22851997, WL 610403, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24,
1997).
97. Wright, supra note 20, at 1269–76. See also Marc J. Posner, The Estelle Medical
Professional Judgment Standard: The Right of those in State Custody to Receive High-Cost
Medical Treatments, 18 AM. J.L. MED. 347, 347 (1992) (“[T]he financial considerations of states
should play no role in determining the rights of [prisoners] to receive high-cost medical care.”).
98. Posner, supra note 97, at 353 (“[T]he Estelle medical professional judgment standard . . .
does not seem to take the cost of the treatment into consideration at all.”); Wright, supra note 20,
at 1269 (“[T]he Estelle standard . . . does not consider the cost of the treatment as influencing the
prisoner’s right to medical care.”).
99. See supra notes 97–98.
100. Posner, supra note 97, at 353–54; Wright, supra note 20, at 1269–76.
101. Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir. 1985); Taylor v. Barnett, 105
F.Supp. 2d 483, 489 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2000).
102. Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1573.
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treatments so long as they do not act with deliberate indifference to the serious
medical needs of their inmates. Conversely, deliberately indifferent actions
cannot be justified on the grounds that providing the necessary treatment
would be too costly; this would allow medical care to fall below a “minimally
adequate level.”
This interpretation of Hamm finds support in other post-Estelle cases.
Cases addressing cost considerations do not generally arise in the context of a
prison’s refusal to provide treatment because such treatment is too costly.
Rather, these cases generally arise where prison authorities have withheld
treatment in an attempt to coerce inmates to pay for their own treatment.103
While some courts have recognized that it is not improper to require a prisoner
to pay for treatment out of his own funds,104 the courts generally agree that
refusing to pay for treatment of a prisoner’s serious medical needs constitutes
deliberate indifference.105 In essence, the high cost of a medical procedure or
treatment cannot constitutionalize a prison official’s otherwise deliberately
indifferent refusal to provide an inmate with that treatment. Consequently, the
cost of the treatment sought plays no part in determining whether prison
officials have acted with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical
needs.
d.

Providing “Easier and Less Efficacious” Treatment Constitutes
Deliberate Indifference

The provision of “easier and less efficacious treatment” refers to treating
an inmate’s medical condition with a simpler, yet less effective remedy, when
a more complex, more effective remedy is available.106 This theme connects
with several of the other deliberate indifference themes previously discussed.
For example, providing an easier and less efficacious treatment may be viewed
as the reverse of an appropriate exercise of medical judgment. While
103. See generally Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326
(3d Cir. 1987); Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc. 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985); Archer v.
Dutcher, 733 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1984); Martin v. DeBruyn, 880 F.Supp. 610 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
104. Martin, 880 F.Supp. at 615 (“[I]nsisting that an inmate with sufficient funds use those
funds to pay for medical care is neither deliberate indifference nor punishment.”).
105. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 345 (“[P]risons should be and are constitutionally required to
provide for [i.e., at the institution’s expense] all the serious medical needs of the inmates, whose
imposed financial dependency is . . . a result of their incarceration.”) (quoting Monmouth County
Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 643 F.Supp. 1217, 1227 (D.N.J. 1986); Ancata, 769 F.2d
at 704 (“Delay in medical treatment cannot be justified as a means to coerce payment.”); Martin,
880 F.Supp. at 615 (“A prison official who withholds necessary medical care, for want of
payment, from an inmate who could not pay would violate the inmate’s constitutional rights if the
inmate’s medical needs were serious.”).
106. See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158 (2d
Cir. 2003); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999); West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158 (3d
Cir. 1978); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974).
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differences of opinion fail to constitute deliberate indifference, prescription of
an easier and less efficacious treatment “alleges more than . . . solely . . . a
disagreement with a doctor’s professional judgment.”107 Similarly, the
prescription of an easier and less efficacious treatment may be motivated by an
impermissible consideration of cost.108
The “easier and less efficacious” treatment language first appeared in the
pre-Estelle case of Williams v. Vincent.109 There, the Second Circuit held that
a prison doctor violated an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights when, rather
that reattaching the prisoner’s severed ear, the doctor discarded it, told the
prisoner that “he did not need his ear,” and stitched up the stump.110 Reversing
the lower court’s decision to dismiss Williams’s claim, the court found that the
doctor’s use of an “easier and less efficacious treatment” may have constituted
deliberate indifference.111
Though Williams predates Estelle, it nonetheless remains good law,112 and
post-Estelle decisions frequently employ its “easier and less efficacious”
language.113 In West v. Keve, for example, the Third Circuit reversed a lower
court decision dismissing a prisoner’s claim that prison officials had acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.114 There, the inmate had
received surgery to correct various afflictions of his right leg, yet he asserted
that prison officials were deliberately indifferent in their provision of postoperative care.115 While the prisoner had been provided aspirin for his pain,
the court in West concluded that such a treatment plan may constitute “an
easier and less efficacious treatment.”116 The case was reversed and remanded
for further proceedings.117

107. Williams, 508 F.2d at 544. More recently, the Second Circuit observed that providing
easier and less efficacious treatment “could constitute deliberate indifference rather than a mere
difference of opinion over a matter of medical judgment.” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698,
703 (2d Cir. 1998). See also Ancata, 769 F.2d at 704.
108. Chance, 143 F.3d at 704 (A dentist’s motivation for extracting teeth rather than filling
cavities may have been “monetary incentives.”).
109. 508 F.2d 541.
110. Id. at 543.
111. Id. at 544.
112. The Supreme Court in Estelle cited to Williams as an example of when prison doctors’
actions may manifest deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of an inmate. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 n.10 (1976).
113. See generally Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2003); McElligott v. Foley, 182
F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999); West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1978).
114. 571 F.2d at 162–63.
115. Id. at 160–62.
116. Id. at 162.
117. Id. at 164.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

SO NOW WHAT?

555

The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Ancata v. Prison
Health Services, Inc.118 There, Ancata complained of myriad afflictions,
including ankle swelling, chills, lower back pain, and severe pain in his back
and leg.119 Prison health-care workers observed that Ancata needed medical
evaluation but provided him with only Tylenol II and Ben Gay for his pain.120
He died of leukemia approximately four months later.121 In reversing the
lower court’s decision to dismiss the case, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
treatment provided by prison officials may have constituted “an easier and less
efficacious treatment.”122
IV. PRISONS ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE INMATES WITH MEDICALLY
NECESSARY TRANSPLANTS
Prisons are unquestionably required to provide inmates with medically
necessary organ transplants in light of the themes developed in Part III.
Section A of this Part examines the serious medical needs prong of the Estelle
analysis in the context of organ transplants and determines that the need for a
medically necessary transplant constitutes a serious medical need. Section B
examines the deliberate indifference prong of the Estelle standard in relation to
organ transplants and concludes that failure to provide an inmate with a
medically necessary transplant constitutes deliberate indifference. Because
both prongs of the Estelle standard are met, failure to provide inmates with
organ transplants violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.
A.

The Need for a Medically Necessary Organ Transplant is “Serious”

Although the need for a medically necessary organ transplant may not be
“so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention,”123 such a medical condition is serious under the two other
tests articulated by courts. The need for an organ transplant is often detected
by medical professionals, who then recommended a transplant as a course of
treatment. Thus, a transplant is serious in that it “has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment.”124
Similarly, the need for a transplant can be deemed serious by reference “to
the effect of denying the particular treatment.”125 Failure to provide a prisoner

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 702.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 704 (quoting West, 571 F.2d at 162).
See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
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with a medically necessary transplant can result in pain, suffering, and in many
instances, death. Consequently, under either test, the need for a medically
necessary transplant is clearly serious.
B.

Refusing to Provide Inmates with Medically Necessary Organ Transplants
Constitutes Deliberate Indifference

While it is fairly simple to conclude that the need for a medically necessary
organ transplant is serious, the more difficult analysis involves determining
whether refusal to provide an inmate with such a transplant constitutes
deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Though no
published court opinion has expressly held that failure to provide inmates with
transplants constitutes deliberate indifference, two recent Eighth Circuit
opinions indicate that this is the direction in which the courts are moving.
In Barron v. Keohane, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s
dismissal of a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment challenge.126 There, Barron
brought suit alleging that the prison doctor’s refusal to provide him with a
kidney transplant constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs.127 The court rejected the prisoner’s claim because the prison was
currently providing Barron with dialysis, a treatment which his doctors
approved of and which was successfully treating his condition.128 In dicta,
however, the Eighth Circuit disapproved of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’
organ transplant policy, which refuses to provide inmates with transplants at
the state’s expense, noting that “denial of a transplant to an inmate who
needs—but cannot pay for—a transplant may raise constitutional concerns.”129
In Clark v. Hendrick, the Eighth Circuit again disapproved of the Federal
Bureau of Prison’s transplant policy in dicta.130 In Clark, the inmate sought a
bone marrow transplant as treatment for his leukemia.131 The prison had
allowed Clark to have his bone marrow extracted and frozen for such use in the
future.132 Because the inmate’s condition had not yet deteriorated to the point
where a transplant was necessary, the court found that Clark was receiving
appropriate treatment, and that the defendant had not acted with deliberate
indifference. 133 Citing to Barron, however, the Eighth Circuit again

126. 216 F.3d 692, 693 (8th Cir. 2000).
127. Id. at 692.
128. Id. at 692–93. Because Barron was responding positively to the dialysis, his desire for a
kidney transplant merely represented a difference of opinion between the inmate and his treating
physician. This fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See supra notes 71–86 and
accompanying text.
129. Id. at 693.
130. 233 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir. 2000).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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“remind[ed] the Bureau of Prisons that its policies in connection with
transplants, if applied inflexibly, may raise constitutional questions.”134
The following sections address the issue of medically necessary organ
transplantation for prisoners in the context of the four deliberate indifference
themes developed in Part III of this Note. Such analysis proves that the Eighth
Circuit was correct in Barron and Clark; refusal to provide inmates with
medically necessary organ transplants does raise constitutional concerns.
Indeed, such a refusal unquestionably constitutes deliberate indifference to a
prisoner’s serious medical needs.
1.

The Need for Medically Necessary Organ Transplants Goes Beyond a
Difference of Opinion

When a treating physician has recommended that a prisoner receive a lifesaving transplant, prison officials’ refusal to provide such a procedure cannot
be justified as a difference of opinion. Differences of opinion arise in two
ways. First, a prisoner and his treating physician may have different views on
the appropriate course of treatment.135 Second, different medical personnel
can disagree about the most appropriate way to treat an inmate’s medical
condition.136 Disagreement between other prison officials and medical
personnel as to the appropriate course of treatment, however, does not justify
refusal to provide an inmate with a recommended procedure. After a doctor
has prescribed a course of treatment, prison officials manifest deliberate
indifference by interfering with or refusing to provide an inmate with the
prescribed treatment.137
Where medical personnel have determined that a prisoner is a good
candidate for organ transplantation and have recommended that the inmate
undergo the procedure, neither type of difference of opinion will arise. The
prisoner seeking the transplant is in accord with his physician because both
support organ transplantation. Consequently, there is no difference of opinion
between the prisoner and medical personnel. Also, where a prisoner has been
assessed as a viable candidate for a life-saving transplant, it is highly unlikely
that medical personnel would disagree over whether to allow the prisoner to
undergo the procedure. Therefore, it is also unlikely that a difference of
opinion will arise between medical personnel as to the appropriate course of
treatment. As such, the difference of opinion justification fails in the context
of refusal to provide necessary organ transplants to prisoners.
The “difference of opinion” theme is important in transplant cases,
however, because it helps to distinguish cases in which courts have refused to

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976).
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find deliberate indifference from those cases where a finding of deliberate
indifference would be appropriate. In Hampe v. Hogan, for example, the
district court concluded that the prison’s refusal to provide a prisoner with a
sphincter muscle transplant did not violate the Eighth Amendment.138 Hampe
suffered from severe rectal problems, caused primarily by reoccurring rectal
abscesses.139 After enduring numerous surgeries that failed to remedy his
problem, Hampe was advised by a prison doctor that a sphincter muscle
transplant was a possible treatment.140 However, the court found “the
consensus . . . among the physicians involved that the constant recurrence of
rectal abscesses, rather than sphincter muscle damage [was Hampe’s] real
problem.”141
The prison’s refusal to provide Hampe with the requested transplant,
therefore, constituted nothing more than an exercise of medical judgment.
Consequently, Hampe stands for the proposition that a difference of opinion
between medical personnel does not constitute deliberate indifference. As
such, the case entirely fails to address the issue of whether prisons are required
to provide transplants where the prisoner and medical personnel agree that
transplantation is an appropriate method of treatment.
Hodge v. Coughlin, in which the district court refused to find prison
officials deliberately indifferent for refusing to provide an inmate with a
corneal transplant, similarly can be distinguished on the grounds of a
difference of opinion between the prisoner and prison medical personnel.142 In
Hodge, the prisoner sought a second corneal transplant as treatment for his eye
infection.143 In refusing to find the prison officials deliberately indifferent for
their refusal to provide Hodge with the requested transplant, the court observed
that several eye specialists had determined that a corneal transplant was
inappropriate given the prisoner’s medical state.144 Like Hampe, therefore,
Hodge merely stands for the well-accepted proposition that a difference of
opinion between medical personnel fails to constitute deliberate indifference.
As such, Hodge similarly has no bearing on whether refusal to provide
transplants that are not subject to a difference of opinion would constitute
deliberate indifference.

138. 388 F.Supp. 13, 15 (M.D. Penn. 1974). Because Hampe was decided two years before
the Supreme Court handed down its seminal decision in Estelle, the case does not speak in the
traditional language of deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. However,
because of the rarity of transplant cases, the opinion is included.
139. Id. at 13–14.
140. Id. at 14.
141. Id. at 15.
142. No. 92 Civ. 0622 (LAP), 1994 WL 519902 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1994).
143. Id. at *1. Hodge suffered from herpes zoster ophthalmicus, a viral infection that causes
pain, scarring, and inflammation of the eye. Id.
144. Id. at *9–*10.
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Medically Necessary Organ Transplants are not Experimental

Hampe and Hodge, discussed above, provide a clear understanding of what
constitutes an experimental transplant. The sphincter muscle transplant at
issue in Hampe, for example, was “still in the extremely early stages of
development and [could] be performed by only a very few surgeons in a very
few circumstances.”145 Similarly, the corneal transplant sought in Hodge was
rarely performed on patients suffering from the prisoner’s affliction, and the
success of such a procedure was questionable at best.146
In stark contrast to the experimental procedures at issue in Hampe and
Hodge, organ transplantation is no longer considered experimental.147 Rather,
transplantation is “now a routine medical procedure with a relatively high
success rate.”148 Transplants are conducted frequently in all parts of the
country. In the United States alone, 13,222 organ transplants were performed
from January to June of 2004.149 While deeming an organ transplant
experimental may have justified refusal of the life-saving procedure at the
advent of transplantation, such a claim is no longer plausible today.
Consequently, refusal to provide an organ transplant to a prisoner is not
justifiable on the grounds that the procedure is experimental.
3.

Cost is not a Factor to Consider in the Deliberate Indifference
Analysis

The argument that organ transplants are too expensive to provide to prison
inmates at the taxpayers’ expense is perhaps the easiest argument to defeat.
Simply put, cost is not a factor to be considered in determining whether refusal
to provide treatment to a prisoner constitutes deliberate indifference.150
Therefore, the expense of providing inmates with transplants is wholly
irrelevant to determining whether refusal of an organ transplant constitutes
deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. As such, the issue of
cost will not be further discussed.
4.

The Use of an “Easier and Less Efficacious” Treatment Constitutes
Deliberate Indifference

In 1991, the Eleventh Circuit decided Fernandez v. United States, the only
published opinion to hold that refusal to provide an inmate with a life-saving
transplant does not constitute deliberate indifference.151 Fernandez suffered

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

388 F.Supp at 15.
No. 92 Civ. 0622 (LAP), 1994 WL 519902 at * 1.
See supra notes 18–23.
Grantham, supra note 24, at 751.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 97–105 and accompanying text.
941 F.2d 1488, 1494 (11th Cir. 1991).
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from a serious heart condition.152 A prison physician predicted that Fernandez
would die within two years unless he received a life-saving heart transplant.153
Pursuant to the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ organ transplant policy, however,
prisoners seeking medical furlough in order to receive a transplant were
required to establish “their ability to pay for the procedure and the willingness
of a transplant program to consider accepting them.”154 Fernandez had failed
to meet these criteria.155
The court cursorily rejected Fernandez’s claim that the prison’s failure to
grant relief constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.156
The opinion is short on reasoning; after articulating the Estelle standard, the
court hastily concluded that “Fernandez ha[d] not met this standard.”157
Though the court did not speak in the traditional language of post-Estelle
cases, it seems to have based its conclusion on a finding that Fernandez
received more than “easier and less efficacious treatment.”158 The only
justification offered by the court for its refusal to find deliberate indifference is
the other treatments provided to Fernandez by the Bureau of Prisons:
During his time [Fernandez] has received treatment at the world-renowned
Mayo Clinic and has undergone several specialized procedures, including
angioplasty. Fernandez’s doctor has written letters to various prison
authorities concerning the life-threatening nature of Fernandez’s condition,
resulting in Fernandez’s freedom from prison work duties. Fernandez’s
condition continues to be monitored at FMC-Rochester and is maintained by
medication. In addition, two wardens have advised the Parole Commission of
Fernandez’s medical condition and requested consideration of an early parole
date.159

The Eleventh Circuit entirely missed the mark. While the extensive
treatment provided to Fernandez was substantially greater than the easier and
less efficacious treatments in other cases,160 the prison’s refusal to provide
Fernandez with a life-saving heart transplant nonetheless constituted deliberate
indifference for several reasons.
First, no difference of opinion existed between Fernandez and medical
personnel. A prison doctor had recommended that Fernandez receive the heart
transplant he sought.161 Refusal of the prison to provide Fernandez with a

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 1491.
Id.
Id. at 1493.
Id.
Fernandez, 941 F.2d at 1493–94.
Id. at 1494.
See supra note 106.
Fernandez, 941 F.2d at 1494.
See supra notes 106–22.
Fernandez, 941 F.2d at 1491.
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heart transplant after a doctor had recommended the procedure manifested
deliberate indifference.
Indeed, the Court in Estelle recognized that
“intentionally interfering with the treatment . . . prescribed” by a physician
constitutes deliberate indifference.162
Second, the heart transplant sought by Fernandez was not experimental.
The case was decided in the early 1990s, by which time organ transplants had
become commonplace in the United States.163 Consequently, the novelty of
the transplant sought did not justify the prison’s refusal to provide Fernandez
with the life-saving heart transplant.
Finally, the prison denied Fernandez a transplant, in part, because he could
not pay for the procedure out-of-pocket.164 Courts have consistently held that
refusing to treat an inmate’s serious medical needs because of the prisoner’s
inability to personally finance the procedure constitutes deliberate
indifference.165
Simply put, Fernandez v. United States was wrongly decided. Despite the
fact that the prison officials provided him with other expensive and cuttingedge treatment, they nonetheless refused to provide Fernandez with a lifesaving, non-experimental, doctor-recommended procedure, in part because of
his inability to pay for the operation out of his own funds. Under current
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the prison clearly manifested deliberate
indifference to Fernandez’s serious medical needs.
V. QUIETING THE PUBLIC OUTCRY
In light of the foregoing, refusal by prison officials to provide inmates with
medically necessary transplants constitutes deliberate indifference to the
prisoner’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Recurring themes in defining a serious medical need unequivocally indicate
that the need for a medically necessary organ transplant is serious. Similarly,
the four recurring themes in defining deliberate indifference clearly suggest
that failure to provide a prisoner with the life-saving procedure required to
remedy this serious medical need constitutes deliberate indifference. Although
providing these procedures to inmates has caused strong public backlash, it is
inevitable that, to comply with the Eighth Amendment, prisons must continue
to provide prisoners with life-saving organ transplants.

162. 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
163. See generally Grantham, supra note 24.
164. Fernandez, 941 F.2d at 1493. The Bureau of Prisons’ policy required that inmates
seeking medical furlough for organ transplantation “establish their ability to pay for the
procedure and the willingness of a transplant program to consider accepting them.” Id. (emphasis
added). Consequently, Fernandez’s inability to receive a transplant was attributable in part to his
inability to finance the procedure.
165. See supra notes 97–105 and accompanying text.
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In the context of organ transplants for inmates, therefore, the constitutional
issue is the “easy” one. Because prisons are constitutionally required to
provide inmates with life-saving organ transplants, the more difficult question
then becomes how to quell the strong public outcry against the provision of
organ transplants to prisoners. This section considers possible ways to
diminish the public’s aversion to prisoner organ transplants.
Because the public’s dislike of prisoner organ transplants is rooted in three
interrelated matters, this section will address possible solutions to each matter
independently. Section A considers potential ways to alleviate the public’s
concern that the country’s limited organ supply is going to inmates rather than
law-abiding citizens. Section B considers how to decrease the public’s
perception of the costs associated with providing prisoners with life-saving
transplants. Finally, Section C considers possible methods to decrease the
number of elderly inmates in the country’s prison system. In light of this
examination, this Note concludes that methods aimed at decreasing the
country’s elderly inmate population represent the only practical solution to the
public’s rage at providing organ transplants to prison inmates.
A.

Addressing Scarcity

One of the primary reasons for the public’s dislike of prisoner organ
transplants is the concern that a life-saving organ transplant may be provided
to a prisoner at the expense of a law-abiding citizen.166 Framed in this manner,
the debate over organ transplants for prisoners is essentially a dispute about
how to best allocate our nation’s scarce resources. Solutions to the public’s
perception of prisoner transplants that focus on scarcity can best be divided
into two categories.
The first category argues that the public outcry can best be quieted by
revising the method by which organ recipients are selected. Currently, organ
allocation is based on medically objective criteria.167 Those in favor of altering
the organ allocation system propose injecting subjective factors into the
consideration in an attempt to measure the social worth of potential recipients.
By considering subjective, as well as objective factors, proponents of this
solution hope to ensure that our limited organ supply goes to the most “socially
worthy” individuals.168

166. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
167. What We Do: Organ Center, at www.unos.org/whatWeDo/organCenter.asp (last visited
Sept. 8, 2004). UNOS considers such factors as “blood type, tissue type, size of the organ,
medical urgency . . . as well as time already spent on the waiting list and distance between donor
and recipient.” Id.
168. See Robert F. Weir, The Issue of Fairness in the Allocation of Organs, 20 J. CORP. L. 91,
96–97 (1995). Weir does not address the receipt of transplants by prison inmates but does discuss
a proposal for organ allocation that would consider social factors such as
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Scholars passionately disagree, however, about the prudence of using
social criteria in organ allocation.169 In fact, articles published on the subject
seem evenly divided between those in support of and those in opposition to the
allocation of organs according to the social worth of the recipient.170 Due to
the controversial nature of this proposal, it is unlikely that modifying the
system of organ allocation to exclude prisoners constitutes a viable way to
quiet the public outcry against prisoner receipt of organ transplants.
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, UNOS refuses to consider
social criteria in determining to whom organs will be provided.171 Because
UNOS, the sole organization responsible for prioritizing candidates for organ
transplants in this country, has wholly rejected the concept of considering
social worth in organ allocation, such a solution to the public’s dislike of
prisoner organ transplants is entirely unrealistic.
In contrast to modifying the current system of organ allocation, the second
proposed solution focuses on solving the organ-scarcity dilemma by increasing
the number of organs available for transplant. By doing so, the receipt of an
organ by a prisoner will not mean the death of a law-abiding citizen. Solutions
intended to increase the number of organs available for transplant can be
divided into two categories.

the family role factor, which gives preference to parents of minor children over single
adults . . . the ‘potential future contributions’ factor, according to which society would
choose to ‘invest’ a scarce resource in individuals who are thought likely (based on age,
talents, training, and past record) to give valuable ‘return’ on the investment in terms of
prospective service, and . . . the ‘past services rendered’ factor . . . in which society
recognizes and rewards the retrospective service rendered by individuals.
Id.; John C. West, et al., Organ Allocation: A Case for not Transplanting the Violent Criminal, in
SEMINARS IN DIALYSIS 362, 362 (Aaron Spital ed., 2003) (arguing that “transplanting even one
[violent felon] should be deemed inadvisable”); David L. Perry, Criminals Should Be Far Down
on the Heart Transplant List, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 31, 2002, at 10B (“[I]f we
knowingly commit . . . crimes and thus violate others’ basic rights not to be harmed or killed, we
lose the right to an organ transplant when it could save the life of an innocent person.”).
169. See Jeffery Kahn, The Ethics of Organ Transplantation in Prisoners, in SEMINARS IN
DIALYSIS, supra note 168, at 365 (arguing that “[w]hile prisoners forfeit many freedoms, access
to and the provision of adequate heath care are guaranteed to them, and ought to include access to
organ transplants”); Change of Heart, supra note 39 (quoting Dr. Lawrence Schneiderman, a
proponent of refusing heart transplants to murders, as recognizing that consideration of such
subjective criteria is a “slippery slope”).
170. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text.
171. What We Do: Organ Center, supra note 167. Criteria aimed at measuring a potential
recipient’s social worth are entirely absent from factors considered by UNOS when allocating
available organs. Id. See also Wright, supra note 20, at 1257 (“UNOS bases its policy decisions
on objective medical criteria, not on the perceived social worth of those seeking organs. The
UNOS ethics committee believes, for example, that being accused or convicted of a crime is
irrelevant to the selection of transplant recipients.”) (footnote omitted).
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The first category encompasses controversial solutions aimed at altering
the organ-harvesting system currently in place in the United States. Such
proposed solutions include presumed consent,172 a theory under which
individuals are presumed to consent to organ donation unless they explicitly
indicate otherwise; the creation of a market for human organs;173 and the use of
prison inmates as an additional source of organs available for
transplantation.174 While these ideas provide seemingly endless fodder for
legal scholars,175 there are as many advocates for each solution as there are
opponents. Consequently, much like the use of social criteria in organ
allocation, these controversial proposals aimed at increasing the nation’s organ
supply fail to present feasible solutions to the organ shortage.
The second category of solutions aimed at increasing organ supplies in the
United States is far from controversial. Rather than modifying the nation’s
organ-harvesting system, this proposed solution argues that organ supplies can
best be increased by educating the public about the need for organs and the
rewards of organ donation. This more moderate solution is already in place in

172. See Keller, supra note 19, at 895 (arguing that presumed consent “should be expanded to
include the procurement of all organs”); Samantha A. Wilcox, Comment, Presumed Consent
Organ Donation in Pennsylvania: One Small Step for Pennsylvania, One Giant Leap for Organ
Donation, 107 DICK. L. REV. 935, 951 (2003) (arguing that presumed consent “offers several
benefits that the current organ donation system does not”). But see Troy R. Jensen, Comment,
Organ Procurement: Various Legal Systems and Their Effectiveness, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 555,
572–73 (2000) (observing the ineffectiveness of Brazil’s failed presumed consent law, and
concluding that presumed consent “is a quickly dissipating method of organ procurement”);
Carrie Parsons O’Keeffe, Note, When an Anatomical “Gift” Isn’t a Gift: Presumed Consent Laws
as an Affront to Religious Liberty, 7 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 287, 316 (asserting that “[p]resumed
consent offends state, national, and international values as they are stated in our federal
Constitution. . . . American laws and ethics demand that . . . an ‘anatomical gift’ is, indeed, a
gift”).
173. See David Kaserman, Markets for Organs: Myths and Misconceptions, 18 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 567, 580 (2002) (arguing that organ markets are the “most promising option”
to solving the country’s organ shortage). But see Christian Williams, Note, Combatting the
Problems of Human Rights Abuses and Inadequate Organ Supply Through Presumed Donative
Consent, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 315, 344 (1994) (labeling the creation of a market in human
organs as “the most controversial of all proposed organ procurement systems”).
174. See Laura-Hill M. Patton, Note, A Call for Common Sense: Organ Donation and the
Executed Prisoner, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 433 (1996) (offering “compelling arguments in
favor of organ donation by executed prisoners” and asserting that the practice “comports with
common sense”); Donny J. Perales, Comment, Rethinking the Prohibition of Death Row
Prisoners as Organ Donors: A Possible Lifeline to Those on Organ Donor Waiting Lists, 34 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 687, 732 (2003) (arguing that the use of executed prisoners’ organs for transplant
presents a “viable method” to solving the country’s organ shortage). But see Whitney Hinkle,
Note, Giving Until it Hurts: Prisoners Are Not the Answer to the National Organ Shortage, 35
IND. L. REV. 593, 593 (2002) (arguing that “prisoners, whether executed or living, should not
become organ donors”).
175. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
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the United States and is the solution embraced by UNOS.176 In furtherance of
this goal, UNOS founded The Coalition on Donation in 1993, “a separate, nonprofit alliance of national organizations and coalitions across the United States,
dedicated solely to educating the public about organ and tissue donation.”177
Similarly, in 2001, UNOS created the National Speakers Bureau, an
organization of lecturers dedicated to “assist[ing] corporate America and
national organizations with educating individuals about the need for organ and
tissue donation and how to become a donor.”178
Because educating the public about organ donation is not controversial and
because it has been embraced and implemented by UNOS, it would at first
glance seem to be a viable solution to America’s organ shortage. Time has
proven, however, that this is not the case. The Coalition on Donation has been
in existence for more than a decade, and the National Speakers Bureau has
been educating the public for approximately three years.179 Despite these
nationwide attempts to increase organ donation, the ratio of available organs to
hopeful recipients remains abysmally low.180 Consequently, while public
education may have some impact on the number of available organs, it fails to
offer a practical solution to the organ shortage in America. As such, it
similarly fails to present a solution to the public’s outrage at providing
prisoners with organ transplants.
B.

Addressing Cost

The second factor that plays a part in the public’s abhorrence of prisoner
receipt of organ transplants is the cost of the procedures. With the cost of an
organ transplant averaging more than $200,000,181 many dislike the idea of
providing inmates with such procedures at the taxpayers’ expense.182 Framed
in this manner, the public outcry against prisoner organ transplants is actually a
concern about how valuable tax dollars are being spent. Consequently, another
potential solution to the public outcry against prisoner organ transplants may
be to educate the public about the actual, rather than the perceived, costs of
providing inmates with organ transplants.

176. See Help Save a Life: Promote Organ Donation, at http://www.unos.org/helpSaveALife/
promoteOrganDonation/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2004); What We Do: Donation Education, at
http://www.unos.org/whatWeDo/donationEducation.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
177. What We Do: Donation Education, supra note 176. For more extensive information on
the Coalition on Donation, visit http://www.donatelife.net.
178. Help Save a Life: Promote Organ Donation: Find a Speaker, at http://www.unos.org/
helpsavealife/promoteorgandonation/findaspeaker.asp (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).
179. See supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text.
180. See Will, supra note 33, at 70.
181. Lesko & Buckley, supra note 29, at 19.
182. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the best way to change the public’s perception of organ transplant
costs is to show that prisoner organ transplants are, in reality, saving the
taxpayers money. This is particularly true in the case of kidney transplants.
When an inmate is suffering from kidney failure, two options are available:
The inmate may either undergo dialysis or receive a new kidney.183 A
prisoner’s dialysis is estimated to cost $120,000 per year.184 Because dialysis
is not a cure for kidney failure, but rather a treatment, taxpayers are required to
pay $120,000 every year for every prison inmate in need of dialysis. In
contrast, the estimated cost of a kidney transplant is only $100,000.185
Provided the procedure goes as planned, the $100,000 will be a one-time cost
and a cure, rather than a treatment, for the inmate’s kidney failure.
Consequently, providing inmates with kidney transplants, rather than dialysis,
is sure to save the taxpayers millions.
The argument that prisoner kidney transplants are cost effective is not
novel. In 2003, when convicted killer and death-row inmate Horacio Alberto
Reyes-Camarena was seeking a kidney transplant, newspapers and ReyesCamarena alike pointed out that his receipt of a transplant would save the
taxpayers a significant sum of money in the long run.186 Considering that
Reyes-Camarena’s dialysis could have lasted more than a decade, during
which time the prisoner exhausted his appeals,187 his receipt of a kidney
transplant could potentially have saved Oregon taxpayers $1.1 million.188
These numbers unequivocally indicate that prisoner receipt of kidney
transplants is sure to save taxpayers millions.
While the cost of kidney transplants provides compelling support for the
argument that prisoner organ transplants are cost-effective, the cases of other
organ transplants fail to lend any support to the theory. Whereas a prisoner
may be treated with either dialysis or provided a kidney transplant as a solution
to kidney failure, medical conditions that lead to the need for other organ
transplants do not have alternative treatments analogous to dialysis. This fact
is readily apparent from media coverage of prison inmates who are seeking
other organ transplants. Coverage of the California inmate who received a
183. See Douglas, supra note 6; Higgins, supra note 5.
184. See Douglas, supra note 6; Higgins, supra note 5.
185. See Douglas, supra note 6; Higgins, supra note 5.
186. Douglas, supra note 6 (stating that a providing Reyes-Camarena with a kidney transplant
“could save the state money”); Higgins, supra note 5 (quoting Reyes-Camarena as arguing that
his transplant would be “a bargain for Oregon taxpayers”); Ruben Rosario, Health Care Costs
Out of Control? Try Prison, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, June 23, 2003, at B1 (finding Oregon
prison officials would likely have favored Reyes-Camarena’s transplant because it “would [have]
end[ed] up saving the budget-strapped state . . . money”).
187. See Douglas, supra note 6.
188. The cost of dialysis over a ten-year span would have cost taxpayers $1.2 million.
Subtracting the $100,000 cost of a kidney transplant from this total would equate to $1.1 million
saved. See Douglas, supra note 6.
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heart transplant, for example, is entirely void of the argument that the
prisoner’s heart transplant was cost-effective.189 Similarly, media coverage of
Carolyn Joy’s attempts to obtain a liver transplant failed to present the
argument that Joy’s receipt of a liver transplant would save the Nebraska
taxpayers money.190
Thus, despite the fact that providing inmates with necessary kidney
transplants is sure to save taxpayers a great deal of money, the “transplant as
cost-effective” argument entirely fails when applied to other organ transplants
such as heart and liver. Therefore, educating the public about the actual, rather
than perceived, costs of organ transplants fails to present a comprehensive
solution to the public’s strong dislike of paying for prisoners’ organ
transplants.
C.

Addressing the Aging Prison Population

The final factor contributing to the public’s dislike of prisoner organ
transplants is America’s aging prison population. The recent growth of the
public outcry against prisoner organ transplants has been linked to the recent
growth of the country’s elderly prison population.191 Because experts predict
that the elderly sector of America’s prison population will continue to grow at
alarming rates,192 it seems inevitable that the number of inmates receiving
transplants will similarly increase.193 Conversely, it would appear that a
reduction in America’s elderly prison population would lead to a decrease in
the number of inmates receiving organ transplants. As such, another possible
panacea to the public’s outcry against prisoner organ transplants would be to
reduce the number of incarcerated elderly in this country.
The dilemmas posed by this country’s aging prison population are not
limited to the context of prisoner organ transplants.
Rather, prison
overcrowding and the sky-rocketing cost of prison health care are at least in

189. See generally Higgins, supra note 5 (detailing the cost-effectiveness of prisoner receipt
of kidney transplants but failing to present the same argument when discussing the California
inmate’s receipt of a heart transplant); Rosario, supra note 186 (noting the cost-effectiveness of
Reyes-Camarena’s proposed kidney transplant but failing to offer the same rationale when
discussing the unidentified California inmate’s heart transplant).
190. See Olson, supra note 13. Olson notes that, despite the cost to taxpayers, a liver
transplant is the “standard of care” for liver failure. Consequently, Joy’s liver transplant did not
constitute the most cost-effective procedure, but rather the only acceptable procedure. Id. See
also Spencer et al., supra note 1 (estimating the liver transplant to cost taxpayers $500,000 but
failing to present an argument that such a procedure was cost-effective).
191. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
192. See Drummond, supra note 33, at 60 (finding that male prisoners age fifty-five and older
represent one of the most rapidly growing prison populations in the country).
193. See Prisoner Gets $1M Heart Transplant, supra note 9 (stating that “taxpayer-financed
transplants are likely to increase as the prison population ages”).
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part attributable to the large numbers of elderly currently incarcerated.194
When framed in this manner, therefore, the public’s dislike of prisoner organ
transplants is actually just one aspect of the public’s larger concern about
America’s aging prison population.
Due to the myriad problems rooted in elderly prisoners, scholars have
proposed various methods by which to decrease the country’s number of
elderly incarcerated. Such proposals include medical parole for terminally ill
prisoners,195 early release for elderly prisoners,196 and consideration of age in
sentencing.197 Unlike the proposed solutions to organ scarcity, which exist in
the United States only within scholarly literature,198 proposed solutions to the
dramatic increase in elderly inmates are actually in place in some states.199
Furthermore, the majority of states that lack “an inmate age-based policy”
nonetheless have “some kind of elder inmate response.”200
While this Note does not attempt to determine which of the above
proposed solutions to the elderly inmate crisis will ultimately be most
effective,201 it does conclude that proposals aimed at reducing the number of
elderly incarcerated in this country are by far the most promising solution to
the public outcry against prisoner organ transplants. Proposals targeting organ
scarcity are simply too controversial to present any feasible solution to the
problem,202 while the “transplant as cost-effective” argument wholly fails

194. See generally Nadine Curran, Note, Blue Hairs in the Bighouse: The Rise in the Elderly
Inmate Population, Its Effect on the Overcrowding Dilemma and Solutions to Correct It, 26 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 225 (2000); Drummond, supra note 33, at 60; Jason S.
Ornduff, Note, Releasing the Elderly Inmate: A Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 4 ELDER L.J.
173 (1996).
195. See William E. Adams, Jr., The Intersection of Elder Law and Criminal Law: More
Traffic Than One Might Assume, 30 STETSON L. REV. 1331, 1351 (2001); Patricia S. Corwin,
Senioritis: Why Elderly Federal Inmates are Literally Dying to Get Out of Prison, 17 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 687, 699 (2001); Curran, supra note 194, at 258–61; Ornduff,
supra note 194, at 192–97.
196. See generally American Bar Association Criminal Justice Resolution, 2002, FED. SENT.
REP. 53; Curran, supra note 194, at 257–59; Ornduff, supra note 194 at 191–200.
197. See Corwin, supra note 195, at 698; Ornduff, supra note 194, at 189–91.
198. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text.
199. See Corwin, supra note 195, at 698–99 (“States are dealing with their elderly prisoner
populations in a variety of ways,” including modified sentencing for elderly inmates who become
ill during incarceration, compassionate release for terminally ill elderly inmates, and the
consideration of a defendant’s age at time of sentencing.). See also Curran, supra note 194, at
258–61 (finding that, as of 2000, eighteen states had compassionate release statutes in place to
deal with terminally ill prisoners).
200. Corwin, supra note 195, at 699.
201. For a general discussion of the merits of the various proposals to reduce the country’s
elderly prison population, see generally Curran, supra note 194; Ornduff, supra note 194.
202. See supra notes 166–75 and accompanying text.
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outside the context of kidney transplants.203 In contrast, given the link between
an aging prison population and prisoner organ transplants, proposals aimed at
reducing the number of elderly incarcerated present viable solutions that are
already being adopted by some states.204
VI. CONCLUSION
In the realm of prisoner organ transplants, the constitutional question is the
“easy” one: Prison officials must provide inmates with medically necessary
transplants to conform to the dictates of the Eighth Amendment. The more
vexing problem, therefore, is how to quell the fierce public outcry that has
resulted from complying with this constitutional mandate. In answering this
question, this Note has identified the three underlying causes for the public’s
dislike of organ transplants and has considered proposed solutions to each.
Solutions targeting the scarcity of organs prove utterly unworkable. The
use of social criteria in organ allocation is extremely controversial, as are
proposals to alter the system of organ-harvesting in this country. Such
proposals remain topics of scholarly debate, not practical solutions. Moreover,
programs that educate the public about the benefits of organ donation have
failed to sufficiently address the issue of organ scarcity in this country.
Solutions addressing the cost of providing organ transplants to inmates
similarly prove ineffective. While the “transplant as cost-effective” argument
works superbly in regard to kidney transplants, the theory breaks down when
applied to other organ transplants.
In contrast, solutions aimed at reducing the number of the country’s elderly
incarcerated prove promising. The connection between the increase in elderly
inmate populations and the advent of the public debate over prisoner organ
transplants is well-established. Furthermore, policies directed at reducing
elderly prison populations are presently in place in several states. While this
Note does not advocate any particular method of reducing elderly prison
populations, it does conclude that future research should focus on this class of
potential solutions. Given the constitutional mandate that prisoners must be
provided with medically necessary organ transplants, in combination with the
public’s strong dislike of such a directive, such research is unquestionably
critical.
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203. See supra notes 181–90.
204. See supra notes 191–200.
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